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Abstract. Online Social Networking Sites attracted a massive number of users 
over the past decade but also raised privacy concerns with the amount of personal 
information disclosed. Studies have shown that 25% of the users are not aware 
of privacy settings provided by these sites or do not know how to change them. 
This paper investigates an approach towards understanding users’ privacy behav-
ior on social media, e.g. Facebook, through studying faces, tags and photo pri-
vacy settings. It classifies users based on their privacy selections and proposes a 
system for monitoring and recommending stronger privacy settings. An applica-
tion is developed, and our case study examines the effectiveness of our model. 
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1 Introduction 
Social networking sites have become very important in our lives since their incep-
tion. They have revolutionized the world of communication, as they allow individuals 
to communicate with peers all over the world. However, the popularity of social net-
working sites presents the growing dilemma of preserving users’ privacy.   
Each social media site provides users with privacy settings. However, studies have 
shown [1, 2] that around 25% of social media users lean toward not to change, or are 
not by any means mindful of the service's privacy settings. As these services have be-
come very popular over the past few years, more privacy risks are faced by users. 
As of the first quarter of 2017, Facebook had 1.94 billion monthly active users, mak-
ing it the largest social media service in terms of active users, and this number continues 
to grow [3]. Such prolific use was a prime motivation to investigate privacy issues and 
concerns on Facebook.  
Users disclose their personal information, photos of themselves, their family and 
friends, ignoring the consequences of such behavior on their privacy. 
This work inspects the use of faces and the presence of tags as a measurement tool 
to evaluate users’ privacy behavior. Subsequently, new privacy categories are intro-
duced and added to the existing categories defined by Alan Westin [4]. Moreover, we 
propose an application for monitoring and recommending better privacy settings for 
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users. Machine learning techniques are also utilized in order to comprehend privacy 
settings of various users and suggest stronger settings for them. 
This research contributes to the area of privacy in social media by: 
• By using face detection, tags and their location on photos posted by individuals, 
a new method is proposed to measure behavior of privacy of the individuals. 
• Based on the proposed new method, new privacy categories (besides existing 
Westin’s privacy categories) are introduced.  
• An application that monitors privacy settings for users and screens the privacy 
risks in their profiles. It then educates social media users of privacy-related issues, help-
ing users to avoid them when using social media networks. 
This recommender system provides benefits for both the user and the researcher. It 
suggests a better privacy setting and provides the user with the necessary steps on how 
to set up stronger privacy controls.  It also has the ability to aid researchers by helping 
with data collection and the study of user demographics. Such information would then 
be used to design a social media network in which users are more aware of privacy 
settings, as well as future research in the field.   
2 Background 
2.1 Privacy on Social Media 
Social networking sites have been developed significantly in recent times. Users aim to 
create many friends and connections. However, social media users are risking their pri-
vacy when utilizing such sites by disclosing a huge amount of personal information, 
images, messages and others, thus raising many privacy-related concerns.  
By using social networking sites [6, 7] users expose themselves to many risks that 
significantly affect their privacy. Studies [6, 7] find that privacy could be attacked in a 
few ways if personal information was not provided reasonably and reliably.  
Eecke and Truyens [7] discuss that there is an evidence that, once published, remov-
ing a “defamatory” or unwanted data from the Internet is nearly impossible. Moreover, 
they found that while different social network sites provide information protection tools 
to their users, the average user lacks an understanding of them, let alone properly using 
them. As mentioned earlier, most users tend not to change the default configuration set 
to make information publicly accessible. Subsequently, identity theft, stalking, physical 
harm, and other risks are increased. 
2.2 Privacy on Facebook 
Using Facebook, millions of individuals can create online accounts and share infor-
mation with an enormous network that includes both friends and even strangers [8]. 
Facebook users usually disclose personal information, photos, and details about them-
selves and others. As the information disclosed increases, the risk of privacy violation 
increases as well [9]. Facebook content that is marked as "public" or with a little earth 
symbol  can be seen by almost everyone over the internet, including criminals, 
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strangers and unwanted people [10]. They can discover many things about you, from 
what you like to your everyday activities and places you go. For instance, posting daily 
routes on Facebook or checking into nearby location of places you visit makes you an 
easy target for stalkers [11]. Other privacy risks result from offering your information 
to promoters. Moreover, this can be extended to creating a database gathered from in-
dividuals’ profiles; this is done by third-parties who then sell the data to others. Pass-
words or even the whole database might also be stolen by intruders. 
2.2.1. Tagging. Facebook allows users to add tags to their photos.  Tags can be added 
to particular areas of your photo. For example, users can tag friends on their faces in a 
photo taken in a restaurant, tagging the restaurant with its name. According to the Fa-
cebook Help Center [12], the post that someone is tagged in it, can also be seen in that 
person’s timeline. Hence, anyone who sees the posts can go to that person’s profile to 
gain more information. To be more accurate, if the person tagged has a Facebook ac-
count, the tag is displayed as a hyperlink to that person’s profile. If the tagged person 
does not have an account, then the tag is shown in plain text, not linking to any profile. 
So even if a user is concerned about privacy and has taken steps to protect his or her 
data by setting the privacy album visible to friends only, someone who is not a friend 
can still access that tagged photo and display the picture. Besides, friends of friends can 
also view that photo and find more information about the user. For example, it is easy 
to predict the age of a person through searching tagged Facebook photos and then 
checking posted birthday photos [13]. 
2.2.2 Facebook Privacy Settings. Facebook provides different privacy settings for us-
ers. Users can determine who can see their personal information. They can also set to 
whom their photo albums can be visible (e.g. Public, Friends, Friends of Friends, Cus-
tom, and Only Me). Table 1 shows privacy settings in Facebook. 
Table 1 – Privacy settings available for Facebook 
Unfortunately, most users do not know how to use these privacy settings [14]. They 
do not know how the settings work or simply do not have time to read them. This may 
account for most users leaving their privacy controls to the default setting, set to be 
visible to the public. According to Facebook, if the content is public, anyone over the 
internet can view it, including people who are not your friends and even those who do 
not have a Facebook account. In a survey of 200 Facebook users that aims to measure 
the disparity between the desired and actual privacy settings [14], researchers find that 
36% of Facebook content remains shared with the default privacy setting. Likewise, 
Setting Description 
Public  
When Facebook content is public, anyone can see it, even people you are not friends 
with, on or off Facebook. 
Friends Only those who are your friends on Facebook can access the content provided. 
Friends of 
Friends 
Your friends on Facebook and their friends can access the content provided. 
Custom Selective audience, specific people and networks can access the content provided. 
Only Me When you select the only me setting, only you can see the content you post. 
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they find that privacy settings match the users’ desire only 37% of the time, and when 
incorrect, almost always expose content to a bigger number of users than anticipated. 
When it comes to tagged photos, the default setting is that the tag is added to the 
Timeline and shared with the audience with no option available to the tagged person to 
review the content first [15]. This actually raises many privacy concerns. 
It is worth noting that even if the selected setting for visibility is at “friends” level 
and the user has tagged someone in the post, the tagged person and their friends can 
view it. Similarly, the tagged person and their friends can see the post when the “only 
me” option is selected. In this work, the only tags considered are those found in images 
visible to the “public” and “friends of friends”. Some of the user’s information is always 
public on Facebook and users have no choice to change its setting. This information is 
listed in Table 2, along with the reason why Facebook makes it publicly visible. These 
reasons are provided by Facebook [12]. 
Table 2 - Public information on Facebook 
In this work we do not use face recognition methods to recognize celebrities and discard 
the photos that have pictures of people whose information is widely and publically 
available and posting them online would not necessarily violate their privacy (e.g. post-
ing a picture of an ad in which a singer is promoting his/her concert). 
3 RELATED WORK 
3.1 Recommender Systems 
Many researchers have recognized the problem of controlling privacy settings in social 
networking sites. They notice that people disclose a lot of information through social 
sites with little to no privacy context [16]. As a result, they propose recommendation 
systems in order to assist users to easily configure privacy settings. This section dis-
cusses some of recommender systems currently existing in the field. 
In [17], the work presents a system which allows users to display the current privacy 
settings on their Facebook profile. It also detects possible privacy risks. The system 
monitors the privacy settings of user profiles and then recommends a setting for the 
user by using machine learning techniques to look at the similarity of the preferences 
Public Information Reason  
Name, Profile picture, 
cover photo  
Enables others to identify you. 
Gender Helps Facebook when referring to you (e.g. “add him as a friend”). 
Networks 
Enables others to find you (e.g. suggest friends who went to same 
school as yours). 
Username and user ID Displayed in the URL of any user account. 
Age Helps to give the user information that is appropriate for user’s age. 
Language and country Enables Facebook to give the user a proper material. 
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chosen by the user who desires to set the privacy setting with other users who share 
common preferences.  
Ghazinour et al. [5] are interested in the users’ personal profiles, users’ interests and 
users’ privacy settings on photo albums to see whether they are visible to the public, 
friends, friends of friends, or on a custom setting. By observing how different users 
choose their settings on photo albums, the researchers classify them into one of three 
privacy categories. These privacy categories are specified by Alan Westin as Funda-
mentalists, Pragmatic and Unconcerned [4]. A detailed discussion is given in section 
B. Later, the Decision Tree is used to find different profile types. When it comes to 
recommendations, the K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) algorithm was applied to predict the 
class of a new Facebook user by finding the similarities between their profile and oth-
ers. Based on this, a recommendation is given by the system. The use of KNN makes 
this classifier like a collaborative filtering recommender system [18]. 
Ghazinour et al. [5] analyze users’ data in order to understand their behavior in terms 
of how they choose their privacy settings. They found that most of the users shared 
information about their age, gender and education. However, when it comes to religion, 
political views and degree, users were more conservative. This study also shows a re-
lationship between the users’ interest and how they choose their own privacy settings. 
For instance, if the user’s age is less than 21 years old, he/she usually belongs to the 
unconcerned category. 
Mehatre and Chopde [16] propose a Privacy Policy Prediction system to assist users 
to compose privacy settings for their shared images. Their system relies on an image 
classification framework for image categories that might be linked with similar policies, 
and on a policy prediction algorithm to generate a policy for each newly uploaded im-
age. This is done based on the user’s social features. In summary, their proposed meth-
odology is as follows: a) User uploads an image which has both objects and back-
ground. b) The object will be extracted and the background is suppressed to improve 
classification accuracy using foreground features. A saliency map, which is a kind of 
image segmentation, is used to help extracting image features. c) The extracted features 
are then compared with the database features of images. d) KNN is used to classify the 
class of the newly uploaded image. e) A policy comparison from the database is done 
by using a linear matching technique. f) Policy is accepted by the user.  
Li et al. [8] present a trust-based privacy assignment system for social sharing that 
uses resources in social object networks. The presented system helps people select the 
privacy preference of the information being shared. This system, called the Personal 
Social Screen (PerCial), assists in assigning a privacy preference by automatically gen-
erating topic-sensitive communities users are interested in. It detects a two-level topic-
sensitive community hierarchy before assigning a privacy preference to the users, de-
pending on their personalized trust networks.  
Ginjala et al. [19] introduce an intelligent semantics-based privacy configuration 
system (SPAC). This system automatically recommends privacy settings for social net-
work users. SPAC uses machine learning techniques on both the privacy setting history 
and users’ profiles to learn configuration patterns and then make predictions. In this 
system, semantics are integrated into the KNN classification to increase the accuracy 
of recommendations, such as semantics information in users' profiles.  
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Shripad and Vaidya [20] introduce a framework for handling trust in social networks 
based on a reputation mechanism. This mechanism works by capturing the implicit and 
explicit connections between the network users. It analyzes the semantics and dynamics 
of these connections. The system then provides personalized positive and negative user 
recommendations to another network user. The positive recommendations assist in con-
necting trustworthy users while the negatives alert users to not connect to untrustworthy 
users. 
3.2 Westin’s Privacy Categories 
In our work users are classified into one of three privacy categories based on the setting 
chosen for their photo albums. These privacy categories are specified by Alan Westin, 
a researcher who conducted over 30 privacy surveys in the 1970s, as Fundamentalists, 
Pragmatic and Unconcerned. Privacy researchers around the world have used Westin’s 
privacy index to measure attitudes and categorize people into these three groups. De-
scriptions of Westin’s groups are provided below [21, 22]. 
Privacy Fundamentalist: Privacy Fundamentalists are highly concerned about their 
information. They are unwilling to provide any data or reveal information about them-
selves on websites when requested. People of this category tend to be worried about the 
precision of automated data and the additional uses made from it. They are agreeable 
to new laws that clearly explain an individual’s rights and privacy policies. Privacy 
Fundamentalists form about 25% of the public. 
Privacy Unconcerned: Privacy unconcerned people are willing to reveal and disclose 
any information upon request. They are the least protective of their privacy. Moreover, 
they do not favor expanded regulation to protect privacy. About 18% of the public are 
unconcerned. 
Privacy Pragmatists: Privacy pragmatists are willing to disclose their information if 
they gain some benefits in return. Initially, they measure the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of sharing data with the organization. Next, they measure what protec-
tions are available for them and their trust level in the organization. Afterwards, they 
make a decision on whether or not to reveal their information to them and if revealing 
that information is actually worth it. 57% of people belong to this category. 
4 Our Approach 
Facebook currently owns the largest archive of personal photos. Thus, sharing and tag-
ging images is actually built around real identities [23]. It is clear that the presence of 
faces and tags have a wide impact on the privacy of users. A photo showing a face of 
someone with a tag placed on the face could display the person’s name, add a link to 
their profile for even more detailed information. 
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4.1 Privacy Levels 
In this study, all conceivable instances of human faces and tags on user’s photos are 
covered with the aim of categorizing them into various classes based on privacy cate-
gories explained in the next section. The following are different cases considered: 
4.1.1 CASE 1: No Faces, No Tags. Photos that do not include faces and tags are con-
sidered to be the cases in which least privacy violation occurs. At the point when there 
is neither a face uncovering the identity of the individual nor a tag connecting directly 
to the user profile, no privacy violation is implied. However, cases exist that reveal 
information about the user whether a photo contains faces and tags or not. For instance, 
a user may post a photo of a landscape, in spite of the fact that there are neither faces 
nor tags, that photo may uncover other information about the user's present location. 
4.1.2 CASE 2: Some Faces, No Tags. Having human faces in a photo may violate the 
privacy of an individual even if no tags are found. If the person is identified, information 
regarding the identity of the person is revealed and data with respect to the character of 
the individual is uncovered. This case is regarded as more privacy-revealing than Case 
1. 
4.1.3 CASE 3: No Faces, Some Tags. As mentioned earlier, tags link your profile to 
the post shared, making it easier for others to access your profile, view your information 
and discover more about you. This case is considered to disclose more private infor-
mation than Case 2 (faces without tags) because through a profile, additional infor-
mation can be uncovered, making it more valuable for the adversary than just knowing 
the person’s face. For example, a friend of a friend can click on the tag link and view 
personal information such as location, hometown, relationships, and other information. 
Moreover, that user can view photos as long as they are visible to public or friends of 
friends. Keep it in mind that the profile picture, cover photos, and basic personal infor-
mation are always visible to the public as clarified in Table 2. 
4.1.4 CASE 4: Some Faces, Some Tags. The fourth case is when both faces and tags 
exist in a photo. In this case, whether the tag was placed on the face or not is examined. 
Answering this question will help in determining the privacy category of the user. Thus, 
if the tag is on the face, this facilitates in linking the tag name directly to the user, 
identify the user and get additional information from the user profile. If not, extra efforts 
were required in order to map the tag to the correct face in the photo which can some-
times be difficult. For instance, a photo that has a large number of faces and tags that 
are not placed on these faces makes it difficult for others to map the tag to the right 
face. However, this is still considered a violation of privacy. 
This case incorporates three different cases. These cases are listed below: 
a) No. of Tags < No. of Faces 
b) No. of Tags = No. of Faces 
c) No. of Tags > No. of Faces 
Those cases (with the same order in which they are mentioned above) and the tag not 
placed on the face, come next in privacy levels. The reasons for the order chosen are 
mentioned below with examples given to illustrate each case. 
Tag Not on Face 
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No. of Tags < No. of Faces. When the number of faces is greater than the number of 
tags, this might mean that there are faces existing on the photo that have no relation to 
any of the tags located in the photo. There can be faces of individuals with no names 
attached to it or links to their accounts. This refers to Case 2 (faces with no tags). Ad-
ditionally, because these tags are not placed on the faces, there is minimal privacy risk 
involved compared to the case when the tags are positioned exactly on faces. To sim-
plify this, it can be said that the tag does not directly relate the face to the person’s name 
or the person’s profile. For example, a photo which has three faces and one tag not 
placed on the person’s face is less privacy-revealing than a photo having three faces 
and three tags placed on the faces. Figures 1 to 6 illustrate all the possible cases. 
No. of Tags = No. of Faces. When the number of tags is equal to the number of faces, 
assigning a tag to its related face would be much easier in case those tags belong to the 
existing faces on the photo.  It would be much easier for adversary to map the person’s 
face with the tag name and the attached user account. Figure 2 shows an example of 
having a photo with 3 faces and 3 tags with tags not placed on the faces. 
 
 
	
	
Fig 1. A photo with less no. of tags than faces with tag not on face. 
 
       Fig 2. A photo with equal no. of tags and faces with tag not on face. 
 
	
	
	
	
 
Fig 3. A photo with greater no. of tags than faces with tag not on face. 
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Fig 4. A photo with less tags than faces with tag located on face. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6. A photo with more tags than faces with tag located on face. 
 
 
No. of Tags > No. of Faces. Some tags may not belong to any of the faces found in the 
picture. It is difficult to map tags to their corresponding faces, minimizing privacy vio-
lation. Most tags not placed on faces usually do not belong to the faces in the picture. 
However, in this case a user can discover more about other people from the tags avail-
able (as mentioned earlier, having more tags than faces violate more privacy). 
For instance, if you have three faces and four tags in a photo as illustrated in Figure 3, 
the chance of finding personal information of others through their profile is higher. 
 
Tag on Face 
a) No. of Tags < No. of Faces. As discussed earlier, having tags located on the 
person’s face reveals a lot. By accessing a profile, adversary can easily identify a per-
son’s identity, appearance, and other revealing information such as personal infor-
mation, photos, activities and much more.  
Figure 4 shows three faces with one tag located on one of the faces. By looking at the 
picture, it is easy to figure out who the person is, as well as what he or she looks like. 
When it comes to other faces existing on the picture, privacy is also violated even if no 
tags are attached to them, albeit with a lower risk. 
	
	
 
Fig 5. A photo with equal number of tags and faces with tag located on face. 
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b) No. of Tags = No. of Faces. In this case, the tags directly relate the person’s 
face with his/her name and profile account. This reveals much about people found in 
the photo with no effort needed to map the tags to the correct person. In other words, 
information about every person found in the photo is easily available. Figure 5 shows 
three faces with three tags located on them to illustrate the idea. 
c) No. of Tags > No. of Faces. The most privacy revealing case compared to all 
other cases is having more tags than faces, with these tags located on the faces. In ad-
dition, since these tags are located on the face, the privacy risks are higher. Figure 6 
shows a picture with three faces having tags located directly on them. Other tags also 
exist that reveal information about other people. Figure 7 concludes the cases as the 
higher up the case, the less private information can be revealed.  
Fig 7. Privacy levels of all cases covering faces and tags. 
4.2 User Classification, New Privacy Categories 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, Westin categorizes people into three different groups: 
Fundamentalists, Pragmatics and Unconcerned. Ghazinour et al. [5] studied users’ atti-
tudes towards sharing their photo albums to determine the privacy category they belong 
to. The authors mention: “We also use photo albums since users treat them as a very 
personal and tangible type of personal identifiable information. Furthermore, it is one 
of the data items that Facebook allows us to check its privacy settings using the Face-
book API functions” [5]. 
The authors use the following rules to determine the privacy category of each user for 
the profiling phase: 
If # of photos shared == 0 then:  
      The user’s privacy_category = Fundamentalist.  
Else if ratio of photos visible to Public or Friends of Friends < %50 then:  
      The user’s privacy_category = Pragmatic.  
Else:  
      The user’s privacy_category = Unconcerned. 
In their work [5], Ghazinour et al. acknowledged that using the setting of photo albums 
as an indicator of unconcerned users may not be enough. They mentioned that having 
pictures of nature or art works in albums, which are set to be visible to public, do not 
imply any privacy violation which led us to take faces and tags in the pictures into 
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account. In order to examine the model used in this study, as a first step, users were 
classified into one of five categories based on faces found in their photos. Three are the 
main categories derived by Westin. In addition, two new categories were introduced: 
Fundamentalist-Pragmatic (FP): Fundamentalist leaning toward pragmatic. This 
group of people shares little data about themselves. The revealed information is less 
likely to violate any privacy. For instance, users who set their photo albums to be visible 
to public ensure that those photos shared do not contain any faces. 
Pragmatic-Unconcerned (PU): pragmatic leaning toward unconcerned. This group of 
people share some data about themselves which also shows highly revealing infor-
mation. An example of this is a user having only 10 photos in his profile, but with each 
photo containing many faces including the user and his friends. 
The following rules are used to determine the privacy category of each user: 
If # of photos shared == 0 then:  
      The user’s privacy_category = F 
Else if all photos have faces then: 
      The user’s privacy_category = U 
Else if # of faces in all photos == 0 then: 
      The user’s privacy_category = FP  
Else if # faces < %50 of photos then: 
      The user’s privacy_category = P 
Else if # faces >= %50 of photos then: 
      The user’s privacy_category = PU 
Second, users were classified based on both faces and tags into one of the seven cate-
gories using the following rules. New classes introduced here are P+, P and P- where 
P+ is more privacy preserving due to lack of tag use compared to P and P-. 
If # of photos shared == 0 then:  
       The user’s privacy_category = F 
Else if (# of faces == 0) AND (# of tags == 0) then: 
       The user’s privacy_category = FP  
Else if (# of faces != 0) AND (# of tags == 0) then: 
       The user’s privacy_category = P+ 
Else if (# of faces == 0) AND (# of tags != 0) then: 
       The user’s privacy_category = P 
Else if (# of faces != 0) AND (# of tags != 0) then: 
        If (# of tags < # of faces) Then: 
              The user’s privacy_category = P- 
        Else if (# of tags == # of faces) then: 
               The user’s privacy_category = PU 
        Else if (# of tags > # of faces) then: 
               The user’s privacy_category = U 
The difference between having the tag placed on the face or not was acknowledged; for 
simplicity, when classifying users, they were treated equally in the above rules. 
There are many other ways possible to label the instances such as sorting based on the 
number of tags, etc.  However, this method was chosen in order to show the importance 
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of combining faces and tags in studying privacy behavior. Interested researchers are 
invited to select their desired method for labeling.  
4.3 Implementation 
In this study, we present a Facebook application enables researchers to collect infor-
mation from Facebook users, creating a dataset. The application is hosted on a virtual 
machine located in our lab. This system is designed as a Facebook application in order 
to collect information of user’s personal profile, user’s interests or likes and user’s pri-
vacy settings on photo albums.  
The Facebook app is written in JavaScript and PHP to access the Facebook user`s pro-
file and settings. The system uses JavaScript SDK which provides a rich set of client-
side functionality to access Facebook's server-side API calls. 
4.3.1. Face Detection. Microsoft Cognitive Services (formerly Project Oxford) is uti-
lized to detect human faces in user images visible to either public or friends of friends. 
The API detects human faces in an image as input, returning face rectangles for where 
in the image the faces are in the output. 
4.3.2. Tag Location. Facebook API provides the following: a) The time the tag was 
created. b) Tagging person, representing the user who added the tag. c) X and Y coor-
dinates in the photo where the tag is. d) Names of friends tagged in each photo. 
In our application, getting the x and y coordinates of the tags was of interest so that the 
coordinates returned by Microsoft Face API for the face could be compared with the 
coordinates returned by Facebook API for the tags. This is done in order to determine 
if the tag is on the face or not. For educational purposes, the app also displays the tagged 
names to the user. 
4.3.3. System Database. User data collected through Facebook API is stored in a secure 
database. In this work, phpMyAdmin, one of the most well-known applications for 
MySQL databases administration, is used. In this database, a table was created to store 
personal information such as age, birthday, gender, hometown, location, political view, 
relationship status, religion, education, degrees, etc. Lookup tables were designed for 
maintaining data integrity in our database environment. For instance, if a user is enter-
ing his/her relationship into a data item, the User Data table containing the relationship 
item can reference a lookup table to verify that only one of the specified values is in-
serted. However, in tables such as location, the values are inserted in lookup tables in 
case they did not exist before; this is done by comparing the location ID with the IDs 
existing in the table.  
4.3.4     Users’ interests. Such as music, movies, TV shows, and books they like are 
stored, as well as information related to user’s photos, like the number of faces and tags 
in each image and whether the tag is placed on the face (if any). These information 
where collected to help us with the classification process in which users with the same 
interests would be grouped together. 
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4.3.5   Application Interface. Users run the study’s application and give permission to 
it to access their personal information disclosed on their profile. That user will then 
receive a report from the application that assists him/her in selecting a better privacy 
setting. This report summarizes the information provided to Facebook and, in a nut-
shell, notifies the user of his/her profile’s privacy risks, suggesting a tighter setting. 
Figure 8 shows the report generated for the user where personal information, interests, 
publicly visible albums, number of faces detected, number of tags are displayed. 
5 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 Research Approvals 
Before beginning data collection, the following approvals were obtained: 
 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Since the research involves collecting data from 
human subjects, it was necessary to submit the research proposal and supporting docu-
ments to IRB for approval. The IRB is responsible for protecting the rights and privacy 
of participants. Research conducted in this study using human participants was ap-
proved as a Level II/Expedited, category 7 project. 
 
Facebook approval. Before releasing an application, Facebook needs to approve it. 
During the approval process, permissions required are submitted to Facebook through 
the App Dashboard. Some of the permissions submitted for review are: public_profile, 
user_birthday, user_education_history, user_hometown, user_location, user_relation-
ships, user_religion_politics, user_likes and user_photos. Detailed instructions on how 
these permissions are used on the app, as well as screenshots, is also required.  
 
 
Fig 8. The app interface where user’s report displays personal information, 
interests and photo albums results. 
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5.2 Facebook User Data 
In this study, it was of interest to collect the following user’s data: 
• User’s personal profile: The attributes were collected from the user profile are: 
gender, birthday, education history, hometown, location, political view, relation-
ship and religion. 
• User’s interests: This included books that users like to read, music they like to 
listen to, TV shows, and movies they like to watch.  
• User’s privacy settings on photo albums: Names, privacy settings, and cover pho-
tos of each album were collected. 
• User’s photos: URLs of photos in albums visible to public or friends of friends.  
• User’s tags: User’s tagged friends in each photo of the publicly visible albums and 
friends of friends were collected. 
The above parameters assisted in building a set of user data. When collecting user’s 
photos, only recent photos are added. Using Facebook Graph API, the researchers were 
able to get the most recent ten photos of five albums posted within one year.  
5.3 Data Harvesting and Participating Users 
Users were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).  AMT is a service offered 
by Amazon that enables researchers to hire workers to perform human intelligence task. 
Workers were offered 1 dollar for running the app. 200 participants from 15 different 
countries with different educational backgrounds (median age 33; range 14 - 73) were 
asked to run the app at: [URL MASKED FOR BLIND REVIEW]  
Participants were informed that the information they share will remain strictly confi-
dential and will be used solely for the purposes of this research. Photos and images will 
not be stored. The data collected from them may be used verbatim in presentations and 
publications but the users themselves will not be identified. Results will be published 
in a pooled (aggregate) format. Moreover, the collected data is stored in a password-
protected database at our lab where only the Principal Investigator and the co-Investi-
gator have access to that database.  Participants were informed that they needed to only 
run the app once with no need to answer any questions. 
5.4 Data Preprocessing 
Prior to running machine-learning algorithm for classification, it was necessary to pre-
pare the collected data for further processing, including some preprocessing which was 
performed by the two Authors manually. A few issues faced and addressed were the 
following: Having multiple values referring to the same input. For instance, in the reli-
gion attribute, having values such as (Islam, islam, MUSLIM, Muslim, مسلم , مسلمة ) re-
ferring to the same thing needed to be manually fixed so they all referred to one value 
“e.g. Muslim”. This also applies for entries from different languages. For education 
attribute, values such as (Grad, Graduate School) needed to be changed to refer to the 
same value “e.g. Graduate”. Changing location and hometown attributes from (city, 
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state) or (city, country) format to (country) only limited the values we have (e.g. chang-
ing “Boston, MA” to “USA”). Entries such as (Christianity, Christian-Catholic) are also 
changed to their root value. 
5.5 Data Analysis 
After the preprocessing phase, data collected from participants are analyzed. When it 
comes to personal information such as gender, relationship, education, degree, location, 
hometown, religion and political view, users are comfortable disclosing some attributes 
but not others. The red color in the illustrated bar charts from Figure 9 and Figure 10 
indicates the percentage of missing (not provided) values for the corresponding attrib-
ute. All participants provided their Gender with 0% of missing values. On the other 
hand, the highest percentage of missing values belonged to the Degree attribute. Table 
3 shows the percentage of missing values for each attribute.  
 
Table 3. Percentage of values users did not disclose in this study
 
 
 
 Attribute % missing 
 Degree 94% 
 Political view 77% 
 Religion 65% 
 Relationship 41% 
 Hometown 23% 
 Location 20% 
 Education 21% 
 Gender 0% 
 Age 0% 
     
Fig 9. Percentage of total number of records for gender, relationship, education 
and degree attributes (left to right). 
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Concerning albums results collected from participants, the maximum number of albums 
is 25, while the average number visible to public is 10. Participants with an age range 
from 40 – 70 have the maximum number of 11 albums as the total number of albums 
they share. Moreover, participants with the age range of 14 – 29 have the maximum 
number of 50 faces as the total number of faces they share. When it comes to the total 
number of tags, the maximum is 23. The maximum number of faces and tags for par-
ticipants with the age range: 30 – 70, are 28 and 10, respectively. 
While both genders tend to share similar proportions in relation to the number of faces, 
albums, and public albums, there is a significant difference when it comes to the number 
of faces: males tend to share more faces than females. (see Figure 11)  
Almost 32% of the users belong to the P+ class. This means that most of the users 
shared faces with no tags. 24% of the users belonged to the fundamentalist pragmatic 
category, thus sharing pictures with no faces or tags. 15% of participants were funda-
mentalists, while only 4% fell into the unconcerned category.  
Fig 11. Total no. of faces, tags, albums and public albums for both genders. 
 
Fig 10. Percentage of total number of records for hometown, location, religion and po-
litical view attributes (from left to right). 
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5.6 User Classification 
Using the rules discussed in Section IV. B, the Decision Tree algorithm in WEKA (J48) 
was used to categorize users into the following classes after labeling them: 
• 3 Classes: F, P and U.  
• 5 Classes: F, FP, P, PU and U.  
• 7 Classes: F, FP, P+, P, P-, PU and U. 
When running Decision Tree algorithm on seven classes, the percentage of correctly 
classified instances is 87.85% using percentage split.  
5.1 Recommender System 
The KNN classifier is used to recommend a better privacy setting for the user. KNN 
ran on the 3 classes, 5 classes and then 7 classes of privacy behavior explained earlier. 
The goal is to compare the results in order to find the one with the highest prediction 
rate and thus the highest number of correctly classified instances. In all three different 
types of classification, participants are classified based on personal information dis-
closed on their profile. These are age, gender, hometown, location, relationship, reli-
gion, political views, education and degree. See [5] to understand how the recom-
mender system works and suggests a less privacy revealing setting. 
KNN is used with K= 4 for three different attributes. Those are education, location and 
relationship. A 66% Percentage split (66% training data and 34% test data with random 
split of dataset) is used as a test option. Results for different 3 classes, 5 classes and 7 
classes of privacy behavior are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6, respectively.  
From the results shown above, the percentage of correctly classified instances for 7 
classes of privacy behavior is not as strong as using 5 classes. 
 
Table 4. Three classes of privacy behavior for three attributes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attribute Education Location Relationship status 
Correctly classified instances 77.61% 79.10% 70.15% 
 
 Table 5. Five classes of privacy behavior for three attributes 
Attribute Education Location Relationship status 
Correctly classified instances 83.85% 79.10% 59.70% 
 
 Table 6. Seven classes of privacy behavior for three attributes 
Attribute Education Location Relationship status 
Correctly classified instances 80.59% 83.58% 77.61% 
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5.2. Results and Main Findings 
A study is conducted using the data collected from participants. The main results of the 
study are displayed below: 
Users are comfortable disclosing their age and gender. They are more conservative 
when it came to sharing their location and hometown. More than 60% of participants 
are not willing to share their religions and political views. 94% of participants do not 
disclose their degree. Participants under the age of 30 reveal twice as many faces and 
tags in their posted photos than others. When the participants are classified into 7 cate-
gories, a large percentage of users are found to share many faces but no tags. 
When recommending a better (less revealing) setting using KNN, the three and five 
Privacy classes give a better overall prediction rate than the seven classes. 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The rapid growth of social networking sites has a negative impact on the privacy of the 
individual. Although privacy settings are available at these sites, they are not used to 
serve the user because the user is unaware of them, they are difficult to control, or the 
user simply does not care about them. 
In this work, we introduced an application where privacy settings set by Facebook users 
are monitored and better settings are recommended. The application displays a report 
to the user where major privacy holes detected in their profile are shown. A new method 
for evaluating privacy issues by considering existence of faces and tags on publicly 
visible photos posted by Facebook users is introduced.  Based on the new method, new 
privacy categories are introduced to Westin’s privacy categories. 
In this study, data of 200 participants from 15 different countries are collected. Partici-
pants are classified into three, five and seven privacy categories using a decision tree 
algorithm. Finally, KNN (with K=4) is used to recommend a tighter setting. 
 
Limiting the number of photos (recent photos only) to evaluate for faces and tags has 
advantages such as reducing the expected waiting time to load the user report. However, 
this might affect the accuracy of measurement when classifying the user into various 
categories, since other photos might contain more faces and tags.   
For future direction, processing all user’s photos using a faster face detection 
method/algorithm is suggested. Furthermore, faces of famous people should be ex-
cluded from the face detection report. Another suggestion for future work is to analyze 
comments on posts since they reveal user information that may affect user privacy. For 
example, posting a beach image might not reveal anything, but a comment saying, “Re-
laxing in South Beach, Miami” can reveal where the user is her home is empty.  
Finally, future work will concentrate on conducting further experiments considering a 
larger number of users. This is also needed in order to have a bigger training set, even-
tually resulting in better predictions. Moreover, in terms of interface design the aim is 
to display faces that have been detected in the user's photos; this can be used to warn 
the user and draw attention to the revealed people. Additionally, studying the impact of 
the application in terms of the amount of awareness raised is also necessary. It is of 
interest to monitor the main privacy settings that they prefer to change to both before 
and after running the application. 
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